Badme, the Grave Yard of the Youth

For those who want to have a deeper understanding to the Ethio - Eritrea war, I am recommending my own short research paper that I wrote during my last year as a University Student. I believe this was one of my honors classes, I very much enjoyed it. I was looking for an old file in my computer and ended up rereading and relearning somethings including my own writing style and tone...  

Badme, the Grave Yard of the Youth 

Apr.  26, 2010

Contents

Management of Claim

Badme, the Grave Yard of the Youth……………………………………………………………………1

Brief chronological timeline of Ethiopia……………………………………………………………….2

Brief chronological timeline of Eritrea ………………………………………………………………..4

Geographic Influences

Dissecting Badme and its timeline…………………………………......................................................5

            Border as catalyst……………………………………………………………………………………………….9

            Consequence……………………………………………………………………………………………………11

Historical Influences

            Historical relationship………………………………………………………………………………………13

Appendix

Map of the disputed territorial claim………………..……………………………………………….15

Works Cited…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….....16

Badme, the Grave Yard of the Youth

Eritrea’s three decades, rebellious struggle ended with Eritrea’s formal independence in 1993 from Ethiopia. Five years later Eritrea and Ethiopia found themselves waging war over a skirmish territorial claim dispute. Badme, a small village located between the western part of Eritrea and the northern part of Ethiopia with an area of less than 60 square miles wide and home to 5,000 local farmers became the epicenter of a full scale of war that extended to the whole 620 miles border between Eritrea and Ethiopia; igniting unmatched military conflict by recent years in Africa. Some 50,000-75,000 Eritreans and Ethiopian soldiers lost their lives in the two-year war (Negash, p. 3).

There exists nothing particularly special about this skirmish village, yet the explicit contentious claims made by both the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments; it nonetheless meets all three, territorial claim requirements as defined in class note of Dr. Hensel’s Geography, History and Int’l Relations class. The issue that seemed a minor misunderstanding of border dispute turned into a full-scale war. This paper will examine the issue of conflict regarding Badme and whether the sacrifices made by both neighboring countries to retain the village were justifiable.

On May 6, 1998, Eritrean soldiers entered into Badme, an area where there was a history of border dispute but it had previously never been a major issue. The town of Badme had been administered under the Ethiopian government as was Eritrea itself pre its independence. The local Ethiopian securities tried to push the Eritrean soldiers back across the border, but the Eritrean soldiers refused and few deaths resulted as a consequence of the incident. Shortly after, in what seemed the Eritrean government had expected how the scenario would play out, sent its military to the area signifying the start of militarized conflict from that point; one side blaming the other for inciting the first (Negash, p. 1).

The Ethiopian air force then bombed Eritrea’s capital City Asmara and within hours Eritrea retaliated by bombing Tigray’s Capital city Mekelle. This air strike hit an elementary school and ultimately killed 54 people, 12 of which were children, and injuring 233 civilians. The conflict left a scar between nations and threatens to break the bond and common identity those nations carried for generations. Tensions were running high on both sides and things only got worse, escalating towards full war over “…an inconsequential piece of real estate…but highly charged with symbolism as the two nations sort out their relationship after a 20-year war that ended with Eritrea breaking off from the larger nation.” (Negash, p. 3)

Brief chronological timeline of Ethiopia

History books state that the current Ethiopian formerly known, as Abyssinians are descendents or mixed of three groups of people. 1. The Hamitic, Cushitic-speaking people who came from western Asia and settled in North Eastern Africa about 10,000 years ago, 2. The Sabean, Semitic locally known as Habeshas, who crossed the Red Sea from the middle east around the 7^th-8^th century BC. Lastly, the third groups were the Nilotic people from the Nile valley who penetrated into the Western part of current Ethiopia (Habteselassie, p. 9).

In 1869 an Italian private company bought Massawa, and the Italian government formally took it in 1872. While the Ethiopian ruler Emperor Yohannes IV was fighting war against the Egyptians. The Italians were advancing from Massawa to the northern Ethiopian highlands. Emperor Menelik become became Ethiopians ruler following Yohannes’s death. In 1889, Ethiopia and Italy signed the Treaty of Wichale, which focused on designation of boundaries to solve the increasing territorial and border conflicts. Italy then gave Menelik 4 mil francs to buy 28 cannons and rifles. Soon the Ethiopian Emperor realized that back in Europe, Italy had unilaterally claimed Ethiopia’s protectorate; enraged Menelik denounced the treaty in 1893 (Negash, p. 5-10).

In Italy’s quest to expand control in East Africa, continued pushing advancement to the northern part of Ethiopia. Then in March 1896, Italy faced a crashing defeat by the Ethiopian forces in the Battle of Adwa, a small town in northern Ethiopia (Habteselassie, p. 121-125). After the fall of the Axis powers in 1945, Britain administered the Italian colonies in East Africa, and in 1952 the UN decided to include Eritrea as part of the Ethiopian federation. In 1962, however, Emperor Haile Selassie unilaterally abolished the federation and imposed imperial rule throughout Eritrea (Timeline). 

Discontent Eritreans formed the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in 1958. Following this configuration, Haile Silasie is over thrown in 1974 by military junta known as Durg. This event gave birth to the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), (comma) a pro representative democracy movement turned armed rebels. The difference in ideological principles facilitated the formation of another rebel group called the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) rebel faction (Timeline).

Brief chronological timeline of Eritrea

Eritrea with its 5 million population encompasses at least nine different ethnic groups. Eritrean’s modern history begins in 1882 when Italy occupied Massawa, a port in the Red Sea. Then only home to 300,000 local residents in which the Tigrayan predominantly, Orthodox Christians ethnic accounted for 40% of the total population and 20% of the territory (Negash & Tronvoll 5). The Italian occupation split the natural unit of many nations into Italy ruled Eritrea while their brothers remained divided by a border under the control of Ethiopian authorities. Centuries back, Eritrea was part of the Ethiopian kingdom of Axum/Aksum from 300-600BC. Around 600, Arabs from the Middle East introduce Islam to the coastal areas of the Red Sea. Controlled and occupied by outsider forces such as by the Ottoman Empire, Egyptians and later it fall under the Italian colony in the late 1880s. With the ELF movement gaining support and experience, the torch for independence was lit (Timeline).

In 1970 political ideology differences caused split within the ELF; the leftist faction of ELF become known as the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). ELF and EPLF continued to attack the Ethiopian forces separately and at times attacking each other. When the Ethiopian Emperor was overthrown in a military coup in 1974, support from the Soviet Union and Cuba helped the Ethiopian communist military junta reverse the significant advances that were made by the Eritrean guerrilla fighters in the early 1980s. With EPLF in Eritrea and TPLF in Tigray Region Ethiopia, through separate or coordinated military attacks against the Derg, EPLF capturing the Eritrean capital, Asmara, and independence was declared for a provisional government. Once TPLF captured Addis Ababa in 1991, it backed its former guerrilla ally’s quest for a formal independence. Through the referendum the Eritreans showed their landslide support for independence from Ethiopia and accordingly Eritrea became independent and member of the United Nations in 1993 (Gilkes).

Just two years into its independence, Eritrea started showing hostility in the horn of Africa, with an initial invasion of the Hanish islands in the Red Sea, which were previously under Yemen control. Through a nuetral negotiation in 1998, an international arbitration panel gave the Greater Hanish Island to Yemen and other smaller islands were divided between the two. Asmara seemed to take another step backward, spoiling the seed of hope for democracy that was bestowed by many to the revolutionary rebels that were now the country’s leaders. In 2002 the Eritrean government made it clear that neither election nor the formation of political parties would be allowed in the country in the near future. Eritrea was also accused by neighboring Sudan and Djibouti, for taking part in a rebel offensive in Sudan’s eastern territory and digging trenches at the Ras Doumeira border and infiltrating Djiboutian territory. This resulted in the killing of at least nine Djiboutian soldiers respectively. The US even considered putting Eritrea as state sponsors of terrorism in 2007 (Timeline).

Dissecting Badme and its timeline

Triangle shaped Badme, is approximately 150 square-miles, a village home to approximately 5,000 local farmers. Until the locals were displaced by the war in 1998-2000, the village was administered under Ethiopia, and therefore the residents have for generations believed they are Ethiopians. This is exemplified by a 47-year-old local farmer who said, "I simply don't understand why there is confusion. We are Ethiopians and we have been in Badme for generations," (Badme: Village in no man's land). According to the local Head of Administration, Mr. Wolde Mariam, approximately 1,000 Eritreans lived amongst the Ethiopians. These Eritrean residents of the village believed Badme to be part of Eritrea (Badme: Village in no man's land). Once the war broke out in Badme, the territorial dispute was raised in a few more towns that lay within the border boundaries. Small towns such as Tsorona, Zalambessa and Bure were some of the towns that saw intensive military fighting (Badme).

 After the Ethiopia-Italy treaty, the border was delimited in 1900, 1902 and 1908, but because the border was never clearly demarcated there continued to be dispute regarding the official border. The TPLF and ELF subsequently clashed over the border dispute in 1976. After Eritrean soldiers entered Badme on May 6, 1998, and a costly war ensued, the village returned under Ethiopian control on March 1, 1999. Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed for a ceasefire and peace agreements in 2000. In 2001 both parties agreed to a UN-proposed mediator demarcation of the disputed border. On April 2003 the boundary commission ruled Badme as part of the Eritrean territory; but Ethiopia rejects the ruling, and a year later rejects the virtual demarcation. In 2005, Eritrea puts restriction on the UN peacekeeping by asking peacekeepers of North American, Europe and Russia to leave. The International commission finds Eritrea to have broken international law when it attacked Ethiopia in 1998. Then in 2007, Eritrea accepts the commission border demarcation but Ethiopia rejects the request. The arbitration commission orders Eritrea to pay Ethiopia compensation for the 1998-2000 border war, and finally in 2009 the UN accuses Eritrea for supporting and arming Somalian insurgents. After this both armies remain within the border with the buffer zone between them (Permanent).

After a consistent joint attempt by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United States and the U.N. Security Council, Ethiopia’s head of state Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, and his Eritrean counterpart President Issaias Afewerki, agreed to ceasefire and signed a peace pact on Dec 12, 2000 in Algiers, Algeria. The framework peace pact was drafted by the OAU in the hope of bringing stability and peace to these horn of African foes. Under the peace pact agreement, both parties agreed for a 15 mile-wide buffer zone with in the Eritrean territory to be patrolled by the U.N. Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) that would deploy close to 4,200 troops to the buffer zone (). The pact also created an establishment of a neutral five member Boundary Commission, tasked with delimitation and demarcation of the colonial treaty border based on the colonial treaties of (1900, 1902 and 1908).

The Commission was explicitly forbidden from having the power to make decisions ex aequo et bono, meaning that the parties objected to giving the arbitration panel to give their principles judgment on what is fair and just. The parties agreed to cooperate with an independent investigation body to determine the May 6, 1998 initiating incidents to the conflict; among others, the parties agreed to honor and accept the decisions and awards of the independent commission’s as final and binding; as well as pay a monetary awards verdict against them immediately thereafter (Permanent).

The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission “was directed to decide through binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one Government against the other, and by nationals” (Permanent). The commission based in The Hague, Netherlands demarcated the line in Nov.  2007, by current map coordinates in which Eritrea accepted the decision but Ethiopia rejected the “virtual demarcation”; stating, “…it would only accept the commission's ruling after negotiations with Eritrea on the mechanics of how the border demarcation would take place.” (Permanent). Once the commission fulfilled its mandate, it dissolved itself, therefore leaving the obligation and responsibilities to both parties to deal with independently (Permanent).

The claims brought to the arbitration commission by both Ethiopia and Eritrea, were partially or wholly awarded in some instances and the claims were dismissed on the bases of the commission’s findings. Ethiopia was awarded a total of $174,036,520, and $161,455,000 to Eritrea plus an additional $2,065,865 for Eritrean individual claimants; and in turn the commission ruled Eritrea to pay Ethiopia a net payment slightly over $10 million.  Although both Eritrea and Ethiopia accepted the final award decision, Ethiopia expressed its discontent on the insufficiency of the awards, given that the commission earlier found Eritrea to have violated the jus ad bellum (party who incited the war in 1998). Eritrea in its defense remains disgust that Ethiopia still resists the Commission’s ruling to demarcate the conflicting border (Permanent).

Border as catalyst

The un-established border was an issue since the Italian occupation of Eritrea, and the border dispute was simply an outlet to deep-rooted tensions between the political and ideological differences. In addition there was a growing strain economic relationships between Addis Ababa and Asmara. The tension goes back to the infancy stage of those now in power, to when the EPLF, now know as People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), Eritrea’s one and only political party since its independence in 1991; and TPLF the leading party of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) which is Ethiopia’s ruling coalition since it toppled the Derg in 1991). EPLF’s /PFDJ and TPLF’s political ideology difference started as early as they started drafting their revolutionary manifesto as guerilla fighting (Gilkes).

Through an overwhelming public uprising and the a support from the military the Ethiopian Monarchy was broken and Emperor Haile Selasie, was overthrown in 1974. EPLF who has been fighting against the Emperial rule of Ethiopia since 1952 was stronger and had much more experience by 1974, which is the year TPLF and EPRP started their armed struggle. EPLF started supporting and training both Ethiopian rebels (EPRP and TPLF). TPLF objected to EPRP’s political ideologies and thus refused to allow EPRP to operate within Tigray Region, a move that aggravated and created friction between TPLF and EPLF (because EPLF’s aim was focused mainly on over throwing the Derg; therefore EPLF wanted TPLF and EPRP to work in usison to overthrow the Derg. During this time ELF, EPLF’s competing rebels were operating inside both Tigray Region and Eritrea to carry attacks against the Derg. TPLF sought to work with ELF, perceiving it to be a win-win situation until they faced border conflict in Badme in 1976. In addition, ELF’s continued to support TPLF’s competing armed group, Tigray Liberation Front (TLF) in the same Tigray Region. ELF and EPRP (TPLF’s other foe) managed to come to good terms and form alliances. Then TPLF drove EPRP out of Tigray and evicted ELF with the help of EPLF (Negash, p. 12-16).

PLF objected to TPLF’s 1976 manifesto that focused on liberation of Ethiopian nationalities and creating an ethnic federation. EPLF found it to be an unsustainable strategy, fearing that those nationalities would give greater focus to national identity and make it difficult establish a peaceful, homogenous national identity. Eritrea’s fear was that ethnic identity would rise in Ethiopia and future conflict amongst those ethnic groups within Ethiopia would cross the border to Eritrea; due to the overlap of ethnic groups divided only by a vague border (Negash, p. 15-16).

EPLF and TPLF’s other major ideological difference was that both rebels’ viewed the Soviet Union as the main arms provider to the Derg. Russia was viewed by TPLF as a revisionist party and they believed the system was “social-imperialist,” and therefore TPLF sought support in the Albanian model of communism. EPLF on the other hand believed the Soviet Union was a socialist system with a Leninist-style. Concomitantly, the communist party argued Russia’s support to the Derg military junta was a misunderstanding based on the political context present in the horn of Africa (Negash, p. 16-17).

 Ethiopia and Eritrea faced great conflict while determining the boundaries of their 620 mile, shared border. It is important to note that this discrepancy encompasses problems related to geographic location, historical relationship, colonial legacy, tangible and intangible values, states with multiple nations, nations with multiple states and rivalry. When Eritrea gained its independence, Ethiopia was left landlocked, which was an extensive hindrance to its economic development. The ports on the Red Sea costal line had always been important to the Ethiopian economy. Even when Eritrea was under the Italian colony, at least 25% of Ethiopia’s import and export goods were carried out through the Massawa port. It was one of the three most important reasons Italy sought to colonize Eritrea in the first place. Another important characteristic of Eritrea came from being a source of soldiers for Italy’s adventure else where in Africa, along with the strategic importance of the Red Sea region (Negash, P. 7-8).

Consequence

The war was highly consequential and costly to both countries, from its monetary expensive to its disruption of the citizen’s daily lives. It is believed that both countries spent several million dollars on military arms at a time when they can’t afford to feed their citizens. As noted, the 620 mile long border is inhabited by at least 5 different ethnic groups where thousands of Eritreans and Ethiopians live on opposing sides of the border. Due to this arrangement, after the war broke out 350,000 Ethiopians and 250,000 Eritreans were displaced.

During the few months of de facto cease fire, the Eritreans dug trenches and propagated it by saying Eritrea would never leave Badme. The Ethiopians coined the military engagement in Badme as “Operation Sunset”, and they fought their way to reclaim Badme, but it was achieved with heavy casualty from each side. Both countries estimated to have lost some 70,000-120,000 soldiers in the two-year war (Negash & Tronvoll 2).

Both governments have been trying to undermine each other’s securities by supporting and harboring rebel groups ever since the war. The refugee has also increased people fleeing both countries. In the Agence France-Presse report as recent as April 15, 2010, Ethiopia was opening a 4^th refugee camp in Tigray Region to accommodate for the ever-increasing Eritrean refugees. The Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs states that about 2,000 young Eritreans flee the country to “…avoid excessive repression, gross human rights violations and forced conscription into the army." Many human rights groups claim that Eritrea has turned into a "giant prison" (Agence).

From an economic perspective, both countries lose an immeasurable amount of potential foreign investment achieved by fostering cooperative cross border trade. Ethiopia now loses millions of dollars for port fees, while Eritrea’s ports are not being used. Eritrea on the other side loses its main trading partner prior to the war (Last). Large amounts of arable farm land is now unusable due to more than 400,000 landmines laid in those bordering territories. In addition, both sides have bombed major towns, thereby destroying important infrastructure (Reuters).

Eritrea-Ethiopia historical relationships

Two competing ethnic groups the Amharas and Tigrayan ruled the Ethiopia-Eritrean highlands during Ethiopian history since the early years of 14^th century. The Amhara and the Tigrayans are essentially cousins, and share the same race, religion, culture and language with some variation. Occupying the then southern parts of Ethiopia, the Amaharas, were more populated and the region was more arable and resourceful than the land of their Tigrayan cousins. The Tigrayans consequently, occupied the Northern part of the Ethiopian-Eritrean highlands. Besides the Tigrayans who live on both sides of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border along with other ethnic groups such as; the Afar, Saho, Kunama and Erob which creates a conflict between both states. (Negash, p. 5-9).

Geographer Ciampi noted that the Eritrea-Ethiopia border was negotiated and delimited in 1900, 1902 and 1908 but it was not properly demarcated. Italy deliberately refused the demarcation of the border in order to push its control and expand its umpire to the horn of Africa. In violation of the 1900 border treaty; it unilaterally interpreted the border to be under its Eritrean controlled territory, known as the Badme village. In 1916 Ethiopia tried to protest against the Italian presence in the areas inside the delimited treaty, but Ethiopia was not in a position to stand strong against the Italian power. This unilaterally drawn map is what the Eritrean government believes to be the product of the treaty of July 10, 1900 and holds it as the Uti Possidetis. Around 1930 Italy established some control in the Badme area and pushed its way to colonize Ethiopia, but Ethiopia resisted and the allied powers won the war and the control was then transferred to the British (Negash, p. 23-24).

In conclusion, Daniela Kroslak, deputy director of the Africa Program at the International Crisis Group, summarizes the issue best, as she noted, the virtual demarcation of the border did not solve the problem and the Eritrean government became frustrated with the UN for not pressuring Ethiopia to obey by independent decision, demanded that the peacekeepers leave the 15 mile buffer zone within its territory.  Although, when Eritrean expelled UN Peacekeepers and put restrictions on supplies, it managed to aggravate many countries that turned the international attention away from insisting on Ethiopia's compliance to deal with Eritrea's bad behavior. As Kroslak states, “The lingering, slow-simmering conflict on the border is unsustainable. Not only does it risk war, but it is used by both countries' governments to justify political repression. With an enemy always threatening and a war ever near, both regimes have clamped down on their societies, impeding all hope of democracy and economic growth” (Kroslak).

A lasting peace needs to address deep-rooted issues, such as growing authoritarianism and regional rivalry and of course physical demarcation keeping the interests of the local residents close. Clear, border boundaries and a better relationship with the west are two priority interests for Eritrea; while Ethiopian seeks to obtain access to Eritrean ports and ultimately stop the support of Ethiopia’s internal armed insurgencies (Kroslak).

Map of the disputed territorial claim

Works Cited

Agence France-Presse (15 Apr. 2010). Ethiopia opens new camp for Eritrean refugees. [online] Available: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100415/wl_africa_afp/eritreaethiopiarefugeesrights_20100415174022 (22 Apr. 2010).

BBC News (22 April, 2002). Badme: Village in no man's land. [online] Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1943527.stm (23 Apr. 2010).

BBC News. (24 Dec. 2009). Timeline: Eritrea. [online] Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1070861.stm (20 Apr. 2010).

Gilkes, P. (11 Oct. 2005). Foreign Policy In Focus. The War Between Ethiopia and Eritrea. [online] Available: http://www.fpif.org/reports/the_war_between_ethiopia_and_eritrea (15 Apr. 2010).

Habteselassie, K., and Dina, M. (1972). Ethiopia: A Short Illustrated History. Addis Abeba: Ministry of Education and Fine Arts.

Kroslak, D. (8 Aug. 2008). Unfinished Peace in the Horn of Africa. [online] Available: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/ethiopia-eritrea/kroslak-unfinished-peace-in-the-horn-of-africa.aspx (21 Apr. 2010).

Last, A. (13 Apr. 2000). War blocks Ethiopia's lifeline. [online] Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/712032.stm (23 Apr. 2010).

Negash, T., and Tronvoll, K. (2000). Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War. Athens: Ohio University Press.

Permanent Court of Arbitration (17 Aug. 2009). Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission. [online] Available: http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1151 (20 Mar. 2010).

Reuters (03 June 2008). Eritrea-Ethiopia border. [online] Available: http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/EE_BOR.htm?v=in_detail (23 Ar. 2010).

Ethiopian Economy’s Bottleneck

Daniel’s Reflection on ‘Logistics Deficit: A critical Challenge for the country’s competitiveness’ By Berihun Mekonnen

This is part II to my previous post titled Ethiopian Business Review (Part I). Taking 8 pages of the  Ethiopian
Business Review’s (EBR) magazine, Senior Editor Berihun Mekonnen, dives in to explore logistics challenges in Ethiopia. Including an interview with Akakas Logistics PLC’s Director of Transit, Shipping and Transport Kassahun Abberu (PhD). Out of the many, here are few of the points.

• According to the World Bank, in the organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) aka high income developed countries it takes 10 days to import and export, 31 and 37 days in Sub-Sahara countries to import and export respectively. In Ethiopia it takes 42 days to export and 44 days to import (about twice as long as it takes in Kenya, Vietnam and China)
• Ethiopia uses the port of Djibouti for nearly 90% of its import export; accounting for more than 120,000 containers a year
• After the 8 days of grace period, the fee per container per day at the Djibouti port is USD 11
• The average cost of logistics and transportation on the total price of imported goods is 40% (in other words if an individual pays 100 Birr for something that was imported, the 40 Birr levied on the price of the item was due to the logistics and transportation cost that the importer added on)
• A business man says a container which should be released with in a week from the port usually stays for a month or more, costing his company more than Ethiopian Birr (ETB) 50,000
• An addition of 2,000 – 2,500 trucks are needed to ease up the Ethio – Djibouti corridor
• Ministry of trade announced for the FY 2012/2013 export decreased from previous years
• Importing a container to Ethiopia compared to Tanzania and Kenya costs USD 1,095 and USD 310 more respectively (it is USD 2,000 when compared to south east Asian countries such as Vietnam)
• The World Bank’s 2007-2012 Logistics Performance Index (LPI) shows Ethiopia ranked 141 out of 150 countries. Dropping 37 places from its previous 104 ranking in the 2003 – 2007 ranking period
• The privates sector urges the government to privatize the sector but the government argues modernization of the sector needs huge investment, which the government is working on, and the government believes the private sector does not have the capacity to cover the needs, hence why it cannot be liberalized.  

The take away point: Ethiopia is landlocked country and logistics are bound to be a huge challenge. However if we Ethiopians give ourselves a tap on the shoulder and only choose to use where the country was yesterday as a reference and compare that with where the country is today, other countries will continue to have the competitive edge on this sector. Ethiopia has to use other exemplary countries’ as a model and either adapts their ways or find alternate solutions to be on their level. Business as usual and resting our full hope and faith that it will be better soon is not really a solution. We have to judge our competitiveness on the facts on the ground today. Import export delivery taking 10 or more days than the average of the Sub-Sahara African countries is really disheartening. Let us not be in self-denial and be content on the hopes of tomorrow. Because, if today we are rest-assured on where we will be tomorrow, there is no guarantee we won't wake up to find ourselves following way far behind yet again. As we plan to modernize the challenges one step at a time, we must keep in mind so are others. Response to address some of the basic and simpler issues should be prioritized. We got to do better.

In this day and age where globalization is not a choice but a matter of survival, where regional and continental economic integration is a race to stay competitive; partnerships with neighboring countries is a necessity. There need not be a love relationship, but at the very least a working relationship based on a mutual interest. Ethiopia & Eritrea seriously need to go back to a working relationship. Both countries would benefit tremendously from the Eritrea's under-utilized ports. Any grudge and stance of bravado needs to die off. We are both better of looking at the big picture and envisioning for the long term. Don’t think others aren’t quietly laughing at us; to the outside world, it matters less who is the aggressor and who is the victim of of the agression. They are always happily prepared to sell us their expensive goods and services; and even bullets and ammunitions if our ignorance leads us there. Our leaders must remember the limitations of our resources and must not lose focus of their priorities.  The driving force to having leaders, who perform their duties and responsibilities based on the public’s interest however, depends on the existence of an engaged and vigilant public.

Read the full article here.  

Daniel’s Reflection on ‘Business Cards: No insignificant Matter’ by Abebe Mulu

In a 2 page article Abebe explains the importance of business cards and how it is the pinnacle of first impression. An article by PSOW states that, the use of business cards dates back to the 15^th century referred as ‘Visiting cards’ by Chinese elites. Introduced to Europe in the 17^th century, and become to be known as “Calling cards” two centuries later. Entrepreneurs and business card experts say Business cards come in all different sizes and colors. While Business cards promote your company, they should not be used, as means of advertisement and you should always treat the card as you would of the cardholder.

Read the full article here.

Cheers,

Daniel