Trade Aid for Trade

I wrote this paper few years back arguing why the West should Trade Aid for Trade for an International Relations class. “Poverty and conflict are not unrelated,” have a read.           

With approximately one billion people, Africa is the second largest continent and home to the earliest human discoveries. The continent is so diverse in many ways. Former U.S. Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie once said it best, “It is dangerous to generalize about Africa. It is a complex of diverse cultures and traditions, countries that are comparatively wealthy and countries that are desperately poor” (Muskie, 1989). Africa is famous for its infamous peripheral state and unmistakably identified with extreme poverty (Kegley, 2009). There are a lot of problems and failed policies in the way of African development, from the deadliest AIDS epidemic, internal political instability, droughts and child malnutrition.

This paper will mainly focus on economic problems and it will argue to prove that the idea and study of trade based policies will bring the needed development, rather than foreign aid based funds to eradicate the unprecedented poverty in Africa. This paper will also provide a solution proposal for the U.S foreign policy towards Africa. African nations need comprehensive trade reform policies, in exchange of the aid focused funds they receive from those industrialized nations of the world. Such revised policies will assist Africans drag themselves out from the current economic dependence of the core states.

It is true that, as Africa’s one of her own write, Nigerian author Chinua Achebe once wrote, “One shining act of bold, selfless leadership from the top, such as unambiguous refusal to be corrupt or to tolerate corruption at the fountain of authority, will radiate powerful sensations of well-being and pride through every nerve and artery of national life” (Albright, 7). Africa awaits her children to rise to Achebe’s optimism, but for now Africa begs at the door of industrialized nations for a long term scope of comprehensive strategic solutions, that focuses on bringing Africa from the dark shadows to the brighter path where the industrialized east and western countries travel. It seeks for leaders and their act of selfless leadership. Strategy that creates a win situation instead of distributed bargaining by international leaders. Of the many problems facing Africa few of them stand as great destruction in the way of Africa’s development and progress. These great notable obstacles on Africa’s economic progress are political instability, aid based funds and unfair trade and exploitation.

Political Instability

The UN under secretaries Nitin Desai once said, “Poverty and conflict are not unrelated,” (Kegley, 2009).  As it is stated above when there is poverty conflict rises and it is in fact inseparable as humans try to survive by whatever means. Africa has been torn apart from internal conflicts, such as deep rooted ethnic civil wars, dictatorial leadership, paramilitary operations and proxy wars. Within the past six years global south which is dominated by African nations accounts for 90% of the worlds casualties and 90% of the worlds inter-and intrastate conflicts. Africa’s turmoil has created a high political instability. It is indeed a major hold back for the continent’s development (Kegley, 2009). Africa faces problems of political and economic integrations issues. Ambassador Andrew Young to the UN once said, “The conventional wisdom is that political integration has to come first…” (Ambassador Young's African trip, 1977).

Africa is constantly at a crossroads of chaotic political scene. The lack of education, ethnic conflict, fight for power, guerilla warfare, dictatorial leaderships, limited resource competition, religious view, cultural and language barriers are few of the causes to Africa’s internal instability. Such re-occurring entropy has slowed the rate at which the continent could follow the rapid evolving industrialized world. A democratic influence of American leadership is crucial in order to construct a peaceful and stable environment. Stable and peaceful conditions in the continent would increase the confidence of foreign investors in Africa. The U.S has to show a persistent and reluctant democratic influence and help to protect the continent from other countries that interfere and escalade problematic situations within Africa.

Aid Based Funds

Ironic as it might be, aid based assistance is part of Africa’s big problems rather than its economic solution. Africa continues to face a constant extreme poverty draw back. The growth of a developing country depends not on aid but on its economic policies. Various studies found that, foreign aid has not raised poor countries economic growth.  (Burnside and Dollar, 2000).  Let it be clear though, it is not to say aid is always counterproductive. It is true that, aid comes in handy at times and save many lives, as Kenneth Hackett, Regional Director, sub-Sahara Africa, Catholic Relief Services describes his experience before the Subcommittee on Africa to the U.S Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs; he shares about his visit in 1983 to the famine swiping African countries’ conditions.  The following paragraph, is evident of the fact that aid indeed could be undeniably life saver at times while providing prove aid is a short term solution.

 In Ethiopia says Hackett, “tens of thousands of people are moving to main towns …in search of food…during my    visit…I talked with many of the women in the shelters in and around Mekelle in Tigray province” (Hackett, 1985, p. 48).  Hackett speaks about his experience interacting with those women facing despair, who walked for days “when they had absolutely nothing left to eat in their house or village” (Hackett, 1985, p. 48).  Families were separated and torn apart unwillingly, hopeless mothers in search of, a meal, a day having no control of their own destiny; mourn for the loss of their children and separation from their husbands.  Hackett continued his witness describing, “As I walked among this group, I found emaciated mothers, marasmic? children and great despair. In those long days in Mekelle, we found virtually the same levels of starvation as Ghana, about 7-10% of the children dying. Little hope and great despair.” (Hackett, 1985).

Although this is a quarter of century old the African conditions remain indifference today. Perhaps not in the same exact geographic locations; but in general the vivid extreme poverty that Africans face remains unchanged. I do not turn a deaf ear and a blind eye to these re-occurring extreme poverty situations and pretend to swiftly brush of the problem and argue that aid is not helpful but is part of the problem. I myself was born and raised few miles from “Mekelle” and actually lived in Mekelle the very city described above and was affected directly by the extreme poverty as was the whole region and huge part of the country. Even thought I was too young to realize it. I was back in my birth country Ethiopia this recent summer of 2008, and the poverty still exists at large. Just this fall the World Food Program (WFP) had appealed for $460 million funds to support approximately 10 million Ethiopians who are in need of food relief. (Kostova, 2008).

This is concrete evidence, that aid is a short term solution and in order to minimize or eradicate poverty and fair and modified trade, modernized agricultural cultivation, educating the people as well as other comprehensive policies ought to be implemented. In trying to reduce and paralyze the deep rooted poverty Africa faces as a continent, long-term focused solutions are needed as oppose to a short term hand to mouth feeding type of problem solving.

Unfair trade and exploitation

Africa’s third obstacle is the effects of industrialized nations’ unfair trade and exploitative relationship. The expansionism and colonial empire philosophies of the world have been destroyed.  Peripheral countries have achieved their independence, what remains the same is the zero-sum economic system relationship. These poor countries still have with the developed countries. Of course the industrial nations who have the upper hand in deciding and establishing the rules and regulations to their favored one way gain (Shannon, 1989). The rich countries devise a system that is most beneficial to them. In his book Shannon states,  “…from the colonial period, peripheral countries function primarily as sources of raw materials and agricultural commodities for the wealthy countries and serve as markets for the core’s manufactured goods” (Shannon, 1996). The outcome of this zero-sum and distributed bargaining type of economic systems, has sunk Africa deeper into an immense poverty and continued to exploit the continent’s resources.  Those problems above must be addressed and resolved simultaneously in an urgent time manner; to build a politically stable Africa, with a firm and steady economic growth.

 Africans and the international community whose committeemen are to reducing poverty in Africa must focus on the following three main problems; eliminating aid, trade aid for trade and reforming a comprehensive relative gain trade.

Eliminating aid dire

According to studies by Christopher Preble, Cato Institute’s director of foreign policy studies and Marian L. Tupy Policy Analyst, Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity,  “In recent decades, of each dollar given to Africa in aid, 80 cents were stolen by corrupt leaders and transferred back into Western bank accounts" (Preble and Tupy, 2005).  Corrupt leaders are estimated for $140 billion aid funds in the past 40 years. Leaving the citizen with a massive public debt they cannot afford to pay off. William R. Cline, senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics and the Center for Global Development, estimated a comprehensive trade would save the funding countries $141 billion per year and deliver the seeking countries with $87 billion a year. The average income per person has decreased by 11% today than it was about 50 years ago. We have seen the ineffectiveness of a continuing state-to-state geopolitical based aid and World Bank projects fail time after time. “In 2000, for example, the bipartisan Meltzer Commission found that the World Bank's aid projects failed 55 to 60 percent of the time….” (Preble, and Tupy, 2005).

Ugandan famous Journalist Andrew Mwenda in his “Let's take a new look at African aid” speech presentation to the Technology, Entertainment, Design (TED) conference attendees on Sep 2007, asks a provocative question, “Ladies and gentleman, can anyone of you tell me…any one that you know…who became rich by receiving charity?...holding a begging bowl and receiving arms?...does any one of you know a country that developed because of the kindness and the generosity of another?” (Mwenda, 2007).  Like Mwenda, Burnside and Dollar also found on their studies and advocate that one’s growth of economies developing does not arise from aid rather it depends to large extent on one’s own policies to achieve it. (Burnside and Dollar 2000)

Mwenda states that the western donors are characterizing the African problem the wrong way. In other words, their generous funding does not make much difference in Africa; because donors see Africa as a place of despair that needs poverty reduction rather than a challenge of hope and take on the challenge of creating wealth. The funds of the aid going to various aspects of the people including but not limited to medicine, peace keeping, schools, and hospitals might be helpful, but it does not create wealth that breeds wealth. Therefore aid is treating the symptoms and not curing the causes of the fundamental problems that exist in Africa. Wealth is a function of income, says Mwenda “…and income comes from you finding a profitable trading opportunity or a well paying job.” (Mwenda, 2007). Therefore the emphasis should be placed on wealth creating agents in the society, such as entrepreneurs, domestic and foreign investments and research institutions. Attaining solutions through aid funded money is not competent to neither eradicate poverty nor create wealth. Mwenda reminds his audience about some aid facts, “It is important to note, over the last 50 years, Africa has been receiving increasing aid from the international community…over $600 billion…and we are still told there is still a lot of poverty in Africa. Where have the aid gone?” (Mwenda, 2007). 

      Richard Kozul-Wright, an economist with the UN’s economic and social affairs department also says “In the 21^st century this is an unacceptable way of handling international development aid…” (Morris). African countries already had paid their donors back more than what they initially borrowed and yet they still owe those rich countries another $250 billion. (Morris). Africa needs help in solving the fundamental problems in order to achieve its economic independence.

Trade aid for trade

Africa can gain the much needed economic progress by focusing first and foremost trading aid for trade. In other words, the donating countries can provide the aid in a form of trade, investment, expertise and business partnerships. Teaching Africans help themselves, by building and creating wealth.  The African Development Bank Group (ADBG), World Trade Organization (WTO) and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) have laid a basic ground track of recommendation on their “Mobilizing Aid for Trade” focus on Africa report and recommendations. It commends the growing openness of regional and global economic integrations by many of the African regional organizations. The recommendations guide to foreign donors and African nations to utilize effectively and efficiently for a maximum and rapid growth of economics (Mobilizing Aid for Trade, 2007).

China launched a $1 billion equity investment fund to focus on African development, which is planning to increase and reach $5 billion “eventually”; and have no national investment quotas unlike most counties’ government assistance, which comes with quotas and interest rates. (China-Africa, 2008).  The U.S also created the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).  The largest source of U.S funding for trade related programs; supporting many of the sub-Sahara countries that meet the eligibility requirements (Millennium challenge corporation, 2006). Those kinds of efforts and aid have far greater outcome than aid and loans. Aid simply funded to the hands of those nations’ government leaders who have ended up stealing it from the public that needs it the most (MCC, 2006).

Comprehensive relative gain trade

Although, it is imperative that trade agreements focus primarily on fair and balanced exchange of trade, it is also important to notice that “The periphery remains the primary location of coerced and highly exploited low-wage labor… exploitation reinforce the unequal exchange of peripheral products produced by low-wage labor for those of the core produced by high-wage labor” (Shannon 1989). The core countries buy the raw materials and resource for a low price from the peripheries and sell them back after manufacturing and producing them with a high-wage labor. These unequal exchange systems set by the industrialized nations to benefit them leaves the poor African countries with a massive “debt peonage” let alone to benefiting them, but rather leaves them falling into a debt of a high interest rates (Shannon, 1998).

Along with creating a comprehensive relative gain trade policies, helping and promoting regional economic integrations within Africa have also shown to be significantly advantageous. Such as the new deal between the three regional organizations Southern African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) their agreement to create a free trade zone signed in Kampala, Ugandan looks promising (B.B.C, 2008).  All these regional economic integrations have been successful.  For example; if we take a look at the East African Community (EAC), that was officially created in 2001 is a “trade bloc” regional organization consisting of five East African nations Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. In its young age, this organization had been a great success.  The main aim of the organization is to establish a strong regional cooperation in development, commerce, technology, tourism and so on. Its future plans include cooperated integrated plans political matters such as defense, security, international affairs and judicial matters (Katembo, 2008).

African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is another success comprehensive trade agreement between the U.S and African nations. African Trade Increased 115 percent since AGOA's establishment. AGOA helps Africans use the power of trade to grow their economies and reduce poverty. U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Rob Portman said in a statement issued with a report. It supports those politically and economically straggling countries. And “As these countries open their economies and increase their capacity to trade, opportunities are also arising for American exports to Africa." Portman added that aid for trade helps developing those African countries participate more fully in the global trading system.  Thus the U.S is committed $199 million to trade capacity building activities in sub-Saharan Africa last year alone. 37of the 48 sub-Saharan African countries are eligible for benefits under AGOA, are allowed duty-free access to the U.S. market for virtually all products. Since its inception in 2000, AGOA it has helped increase the U.S. Two-way trade with sub-Saharan Africa by 115 percent and U.S. total exports to sub-Saharan Africa rose 22 percent. From one year to the next this trade have benefited both countries and shown a great deal of percentage increase to both sides (The United States Trade Representative, 2008).

United States Representative Byron Dorgan of North Dakota on a house hearing said, “There is an opportunity, I think, for us to look at countries that are cash poor, but desperately need our food,…in exchange from those countries strategic material they posses….Zaire cobalt; Algeria mercury; Zambia copper; and Liberia rubber…could exchange for wheat, corn cheese, and so on…good sense for expanding our trade opportunities (Food Crisis in Africa 1983). Africa needs a fair trade not this type of distributed bargaining style of trade, and the U.S have to be an example in its leadership and the way we conduct business with those poor countries in order to lead other industrial nations by example.

Three reasons why a strong U.S- Africa relationship is important

Market

U.S secretary of state, Edmund S. Muskie addressed before the African-American Historical and Cultural Society and the World Affairs Council of Northern California in San Francisco, on December 4, 1980 stated that “a first undeniable reality is that African nations are deeply important to the United States. We not only want, we need good relations with them.  African nations are increasingly important to us economically, both as markets and as sources of critical materials” (Muskie, 1980). Africa is a rich in resources and with a technologically developed system and an educated manpower, it have a lot to offer from unused arable land for modernized agriculture, jewelry, minerals, oil, labor, forest, tourism and so on. Africa awaits for an exploration that is efficient and discoveries of all its resources.

In 2006, African oil output was 467 million tons of oil and 80% of is exported to the U.S. consumes only 33 percent (China-Africa, 2008). The AGOA has been great for the U.S by creating new opportunities for export and investments. Since its creation in 2001 it has been a great success to both sides. The duty free of more than 6,000 items that can enter the U.S is one of the concrete advantages for the African countries as well as American input, leadership and American joint venture partnerships. Among many, AGOA’s two-way trade includes raw materials, preserved fish, Cotton, flower, jewelry; apparel and oil are few of the items that the U.S imports from the sub-Sahara countries. The trade agreement has almost tripled reaching $44.2 billion for the sub-Saharan countries and double compared for the U.S. (The U.S.T.R, 2008).

Communist China’s expanding influence in Africa

China’s rapidly expanding influence is another reason why the U.S needs to not only maintain but expand its influence in the economic and political aspects of the continent. The Chinese government has a wide spectrum of cooperation with African nations for a variety of development.   At the current rate China’s expansion strategies across Africa seems unmatchable by any other nation from its infrastructure, urban development, road construction, two-way trade, building ports, railways and various investments. China’s two way trade has dramatically increased jumping from a 10.6 billion in 2000 to $73.57 billion in 2007, and its investment increased from about $1 billion to $10 billion in 2007. China mainly imports from the African nations are energy such as oil and various raw materials. Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank, was impress the Chinese leading role that he went on to say “China’s investment in Africa’s infrastructure is good for Africa and…The World Bank is willing to take China as a partner in a joint effort to alleviate poverty in Africa” (China-Africa, 2008).

Finally With the rapid terrorism on the rise around the world, helping Africans reach and create a stable and peaceful Africa that is politically and economically strong as well as protecting it from foreign interferences, is not only important the security and well being of Africans and all peaceful individual citizens of the world.  As the world have witnessed inhuman like attacks from various radial terrorist some of in which those attacks occurred in various U.S embassies in Africa.  Terrorists’ activities and attempts have seen a great deal of increase; most notably in the failed state of Somalia (Dagne, 2002).  Starving humans will do anything and that is why I argue the U.S foreign policy towards Africa continue to build an active and strong relationship, educating and empowering the poor continent of Africa; that continues to seek the U.S.’s presence, relative economic gain and leadership influence.

As controversial as President George W. Bush might have been in the past eight years of his presidency, he has initiated, established and implemented various successful programs between the U.S and Africa.  He has been active, even though U.S occupation of Iraq has distracted President Bush’s administration away from such as the war in Liberia, the U.S still continues to aid African countries against fight on terror; especially, with the horn African countries where Al-Qaeda and other radicals Muslims try to establish safe haven (Hills, 2006).

For all the reasons mentioned above and more, Africa has been getting aid from international donors yet the poverty has not decreased let alone eradicated. That should serve as the evident reason why any plan to help Africa eradicate poverty must focus on a long term goals by a means of teaching Africans to create wealth instead of depend on the aid from the Western industrialized nations.  In the words of Father of Taoism, Chinese Lao Tzu, "Give a man a fish, feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish, feed him for a lifetime”.

Works Cited

Albright, M. K. (1999). Focus on the Issues: Africa. Washington, D.C: U.S. Dept. of State.

B.B.C (2008). African free trade zone is agreed: 10/10/2008, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7684903.stm

Burnside. C and Dollar. D. The American Economic Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Sep., 2000), pp. 847-868.

China-Africa Seeking Equality. (2008, May 15). Beijing Review, Retrieved November 19, 2008,    .rom Academic Search Complete database. https://libproxy.library.unt.edu:9443/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=32138670&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Dagne, T. (2002). CRS Report for Congress: Africa and the War on Terrorism.  11/11/2008, from http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7959.pdf

Hackett, K. and Dorgan, B. L. (1985). Food Crisis in Africa: Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State.

Hills, A. (2006, June). Trojan horses? usaid, counter-terrorism and Africa's police. Third World uarterly, 27(4), 629-643. Retrieved November 24, 2008, doi:10.1080/01436590600720843 https://libproxy.library.unt.edu:9443/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=21007550&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Katembo, B. (2008, May). Pan Africanism and Development: The East African Community Model. Journal of Pan African Studies, 2(4), 107-116. Retrieved November 21, 2008, from Academic earch complete database. https://libproxy.library.unt.edu:9443/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?dir……..ect=true&db=a9h&AN=32926376&site=ehost-live&scope=site

Kegley, W. C. Jr., .R. (2009). World Politics: Trend and Transformation: U.S.A: Wadsworth cengage learning.

Kostova. B. (2008). United Nations Radio: WFP Appeals for Funds for Ethiopia. 11, 17, 2008, from http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/detail/10680.html

Millennium challenge corporation (2006). 11/15/2008, from http://www.mcc.gov/about/reports/annual/mcc-annualreport-2006.pdf

Morris. H. (2008). African Growth Fails to Dent Poverty, UN Says: FT.Com, 11, 17, 2008, from http://www.uneca.org/era2008/media/FT.pdf

Muskie, E. S. (1980). Africa and U.S. policy: Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State.

Mwenda, A. (2007). Let's Take a New Look at African Aid: TED.Com. Filmed Jun 2007; Posted Sep 2007 11/14/2008 from http://www.ted.com/index.php/talks/andrew_mwenda_takes_a_new_look_at_africa.html

Preble, C. and Tupy. M. (2005). Trade Not Aid: Farm protectionism threatens farms in Africa, wallets in America, and lives everywhere: 11/12/2008, from http://www.reason.com/news/show/32936.html

Shannon, T.R. (1989). An Introduction to the World-System Perspective: Raddford University: Westview press.

Shannon, T.R. (1996). An Introduction to the World-System Perspective: (2^nd ed.). Raddford University: Westview press.

Shultz, G. P. (986). Continent at the Crossroads: An Agenda for African Development. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of State.

Mobilizing Aid for Trade: Focus: (2007). United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the African Development Bank AFDB), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 11/10/2008 from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/africa_e.pdf

Ambassador Young's African trip: Hearing before the Subcommittee the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 95^th cong., 1^st Sess., (1977)

Food Crisis in Africa: Hearing before the Subcommittee the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 98^th Cong., 1^st Sess., 47-49 (1983) (Testimony of Kenneth Hackett).

The United States Trade Representative. (2008). Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act:  (2008). 11/11/2008, from http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Development/Preference_Programs/AGOA/asset_upload_file203_14905.pdf

Badme, the Grave Yard of the Youth

For those who want to have a deeper understanding to the Ethio - Eritrea war, I am recommending my own short research paper that I wrote during my last year as a University Student. I believe this was one of my honors classes, I very much enjoyed it. I was looking for an old file in my computer and ended up rereading and relearning somethings including my own writing style and tone...  

Badme, the Grave Yard of the Youth 

Apr.  26, 2010

Contents

Management of Claim

Badme, the Grave Yard of the Youth……………………………………………………………………1

Brief chronological timeline of Ethiopia……………………………………………………………….2

Brief chronological timeline of Eritrea ………………………………………………………………..4

Geographic Influences

Dissecting Badme and its timeline…………………………………......................................................5

            Border as catalyst……………………………………………………………………………………………….9

            Consequence……………………………………………………………………………………………………11

Historical Influences

            Historical relationship………………………………………………………………………………………13

Appendix

Map of the disputed territorial claim………………..……………………………………………….15

Works Cited…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….....16

Badme, the Grave Yard of the Youth

Eritrea’s three decades, rebellious struggle ended with Eritrea’s formal independence in 1993 from Ethiopia. Five years later Eritrea and Ethiopia found themselves waging war over a skirmish territorial claim dispute. Badme, a small village located between the western part of Eritrea and the northern part of Ethiopia with an area of less than 60 square miles wide and home to 5,000 local farmers became the epicenter of a full scale of war that extended to the whole 620 miles border between Eritrea and Ethiopia; igniting unmatched military conflict by recent years in Africa. Some 50,000-75,000 Eritreans and Ethiopian soldiers lost their lives in the two-year war (Negash, p. 3).

There exists nothing particularly special about this skirmish village, yet the explicit contentious claims made by both the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments; it nonetheless meets all three, territorial claim requirements as defined in class note of Dr. Hensel’s Geography, History and Int’l Relations class. The issue that seemed a minor misunderstanding of border dispute turned into a full-scale war. This paper will examine the issue of conflict regarding Badme and whether the sacrifices made by both neighboring countries to retain the village were justifiable.

On May 6, 1998, Eritrean soldiers entered into Badme, an area where there was a history of border dispute but it had previously never been a major issue. The town of Badme had been administered under the Ethiopian government as was Eritrea itself pre its independence. The local Ethiopian securities tried to push the Eritrean soldiers back across the border, but the Eritrean soldiers refused and few deaths resulted as a consequence of the incident. Shortly after, in what seemed the Eritrean government had expected how the scenario would play out, sent its military to the area signifying the start of militarized conflict from that point; one side blaming the other for inciting the first (Negash, p. 1).

The Ethiopian air force then bombed Eritrea’s capital City Asmara and within hours Eritrea retaliated by bombing Tigray’s Capital city Mekelle. This air strike hit an elementary school and ultimately killed 54 people, 12 of which were children, and injuring 233 civilians. The conflict left a scar between nations and threatens to break the bond and common identity those nations carried for generations. Tensions were running high on both sides and things only got worse, escalating towards full war over “…an inconsequential piece of real estate…but highly charged with symbolism as the two nations sort out their relationship after a 20-year war that ended with Eritrea breaking off from the larger nation.” (Negash, p. 3)

Brief chronological timeline of Ethiopia

History books state that the current Ethiopian formerly known, as Abyssinians are descendents or mixed of three groups of people. 1. The Hamitic, Cushitic-speaking people who came from western Asia and settled in North Eastern Africa about 10,000 years ago, 2. The Sabean, Semitic locally known as Habeshas, who crossed the Red Sea from the middle east around the 7^th-8^th century BC. Lastly, the third groups were the Nilotic people from the Nile valley who penetrated into the Western part of current Ethiopia (Habteselassie, p. 9).

In 1869 an Italian private company bought Massawa, and the Italian government formally took it in 1872. While the Ethiopian ruler Emperor Yohannes IV was fighting war against the Egyptians. The Italians were advancing from Massawa to the northern Ethiopian highlands. Emperor Menelik become became Ethiopians ruler following Yohannes’s death. In 1889, Ethiopia and Italy signed the Treaty of Wichale, which focused on designation of boundaries to solve the increasing territorial and border conflicts. Italy then gave Menelik 4 mil francs to buy 28 cannons and rifles. Soon the Ethiopian Emperor realized that back in Europe, Italy had unilaterally claimed Ethiopia’s protectorate; enraged Menelik denounced the treaty in 1893 (Negash, p. 5-10).

In Italy’s quest to expand control in East Africa, continued pushing advancement to the northern part of Ethiopia. Then in March 1896, Italy faced a crashing defeat by the Ethiopian forces in the Battle of Adwa, a small town in northern Ethiopia (Habteselassie, p. 121-125). After the fall of the Axis powers in 1945, Britain administered the Italian colonies in East Africa, and in 1952 the UN decided to include Eritrea as part of the Ethiopian federation. In 1962, however, Emperor Haile Selassie unilaterally abolished the federation and imposed imperial rule throughout Eritrea (Timeline). 

Discontent Eritreans formed the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in 1958. Following this configuration, Haile Silasie is over thrown in 1974 by military junta known as Durg. This event gave birth to the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP), (comma) a pro representative democracy movement turned armed rebels. The difference in ideological principles facilitated the formation of another rebel group called the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) rebel faction (Timeline).

Brief chronological timeline of Eritrea

Eritrea with its 5 million population encompasses at least nine different ethnic groups. Eritrean’s modern history begins in 1882 when Italy occupied Massawa, a port in the Red Sea. Then only home to 300,000 local residents in which the Tigrayan predominantly, Orthodox Christians ethnic accounted for 40% of the total population and 20% of the territory (Negash & Tronvoll 5). The Italian occupation split the natural unit of many nations into Italy ruled Eritrea while their brothers remained divided by a border under the control of Ethiopian authorities. Centuries back, Eritrea was part of the Ethiopian kingdom of Axum/Aksum from 300-600BC. Around 600, Arabs from the Middle East introduce Islam to the coastal areas of the Red Sea. Controlled and occupied by outsider forces such as by the Ottoman Empire, Egyptians and later it fall under the Italian colony in the late 1880s. With the ELF movement gaining support and experience, the torch for independence was lit (Timeline).

In 1970 political ideology differences caused split within the ELF; the leftist faction of ELF become known as the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). ELF and EPLF continued to attack the Ethiopian forces separately and at times attacking each other. When the Ethiopian Emperor was overthrown in a military coup in 1974, support from the Soviet Union and Cuba helped the Ethiopian communist military junta reverse the significant advances that were made by the Eritrean guerrilla fighters in the early 1980s. With EPLF in Eritrea and TPLF in Tigray Region Ethiopia, through separate or coordinated military attacks against the Derg, EPLF capturing the Eritrean capital, Asmara, and independence was declared for a provisional government. Once TPLF captured Addis Ababa in 1991, it backed its former guerrilla ally’s quest for a formal independence. Through the referendum the Eritreans showed their landslide support for independence from Ethiopia and accordingly Eritrea became independent and member of the United Nations in 1993 (Gilkes).

Just two years into its independence, Eritrea started showing hostility in the horn of Africa, with an initial invasion of the Hanish islands in the Red Sea, which were previously under Yemen control. Through a nuetral negotiation in 1998, an international arbitration panel gave the Greater Hanish Island to Yemen and other smaller islands were divided between the two. Asmara seemed to take another step backward, spoiling the seed of hope for democracy that was bestowed by many to the revolutionary rebels that were now the country’s leaders. In 2002 the Eritrean government made it clear that neither election nor the formation of political parties would be allowed in the country in the near future. Eritrea was also accused by neighboring Sudan and Djibouti, for taking part in a rebel offensive in Sudan’s eastern territory and digging trenches at the Ras Doumeira border and infiltrating Djiboutian territory. This resulted in the killing of at least nine Djiboutian soldiers respectively. The US even considered putting Eritrea as state sponsors of terrorism in 2007 (Timeline).

Dissecting Badme and its timeline

Triangle shaped Badme, is approximately 150 square-miles, a village home to approximately 5,000 local farmers. Until the locals were displaced by the war in 1998-2000, the village was administered under Ethiopia, and therefore the residents have for generations believed they are Ethiopians. This is exemplified by a 47-year-old local farmer who said, "I simply don't understand why there is confusion. We are Ethiopians and we have been in Badme for generations," (Badme: Village in no man's land). According to the local Head of Administration, Mr. Wolde Mariam, approximately 1,000 Eritreans lived amongst the Ethiopians. These Eritrean residents of the village believed Badme to be part of Eritrea (Badme: Village in no man's land). Once the war broke out in Badme, the territorial dispute was raised in a few more towns that lay within the border boundaries. Small towns such as Tsorona, Zalambessa and Bure were some of the towns that saw intensive military fighting (Badme).

 After the Ethiopia-Italy treaty, the border was delimited in 1900, 1902 and 1908, but because the border was never clearly demarcated there continued to be dispute regarding the official border. The TPLF and ELF subsequently clashed over the border dispute in 1976. After Eritrean soldiers entered Badme on May 6, 1998, and a costly war ensued, the village returned under Ethiopian control on March 1, 1999. Eritrea and Ethiopia agreed for a ceasefire and peace agreements in 2000. In 2001 both parties agreed to a UN-proposed mediator demarcation of the disputed border. On April 2003 the boundary commission ruled Badme as part of the Eritrean territory; but Ethiopia rejects the ruling, and a year later rejects the virtual demarcation. In 2005, Eritrea puts restriction on the UN peacekeeping by asking peacekeepers of North American, Europe and Russia to leave. The International commission finds Eritrea to have broken international law when it attacked Ethiopia in 1998. Then in 2007, Eritrea accepts the commission border demarcation but Ethiopia rejects the request. The arbitration commission orders Eritrea to pay Ethiopia compensation for the 1998-2000 border war, and finally in 2009 the UN accuses Eritrea for supporting and arming Somalian insurgents. After this both armies remain within the border with the buffer zone between them (Permanent).

After a consistent joint attempt by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United States and the U.N. Security Council, Ethiopia’s head of state Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, and his Eritrean counterpart President Issaias Afewerki, agreed to ceasefire and signed a peace pact on Dec 12, 2000 in Algiers, Algeria. The framework peace pact was drafted by the OAU in the hope of bringing stability and peace to these horn of African foes. Under the peace pact agreement, both parties agreed for a 15 mile-wide buffer zone with in the Eritrean territory to be patrolled by the U.N. Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) that would deploy close to 4,200 troops to the buffer zone (). The pact also created an establishment of a neutral five member Boundary Commission, tasked with delimitation and demarcation of the colonial treaty border based on the colonial treaties of (1900, 1902 and 1908).

The Commission was explicitly forbidden from having the power to make decisions ex aequo et bono, meaning that the parties objected to giving the arbitration panel to give their principles judgment on what is fair and just. The parties agreed to cooperate with an independent investigation body to determine the May 6, 1998 initiating incidents to the conflict; among others, the parties agreed to honor and accept the decisions and awards of the independent commission’s as final and binding; as well as pay a monetary awards verdict against them immediately thereafter (Permanent).

The Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission “was directed to decide through binding arbitration all claims for loss, damage or injury by one Government against the other, and by nationals” (Permanent). The commission based in The Hague, Netherlands demarcated the line in Nov.  2007, by current map coordinates in which Eritrea accepted the decision but Ethiopia rejected the “virtual demarcation”; stating, “…it would only accept the commission's ruling after negotiations with Eritrea on the mechanics of how the border demarcation would take place.” (Permanent). Once the commission fulfilled its mandate, it dissolved itself, therefore leaving the obligation and responsibilities to both parties to deal with independently (Permanent).

The claims brought to the arbitration commission by both Ethiopia and Eritrea, were partially or wholly awarded in some instances and the claims were dismissed on the bases of the commission’s findings. Ethiopia was awarded a total of $174,036,520, and $161,455,000 to Eritrea plus an additional $2,065,865 for Eritrean individual claimants; and in turn the commission ruled Eritrea to pay Ethiopia a net payment slightly over $10 million.  Although both Eritrea and Ethiopia accepted the final award decision, Ethiopia expressed its discontent on the insufficiency of the awards, given that the commission earlier found Eritrea to have violated the jus ad bellum (party who incited the war in 1998). Eritrea in its defense remains disgust that Ethiopia still resists the Commission’s ruling to demarcate the conflicting border (Permanent).

Border as catalyst

The un-established border was an issue since the Italian occupation of Eritrea, and the border dispute was simply an outlet to deep-rooted tensions between the political and ideological differences. In addition there was a growing strain economic relationships between Addis Ababa and Asmara. The tension goes back to the infancy stage of those now in power, to when the EPLF, now know as People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), Eritrea’s one and only political party since its independence in 1991; and TPLF the leading party of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) which is Ethiopia’s ruling coalition since it toppled the Derg in 1991). EPLF’s /PFDJ and TPLF’s political ideology difference started as early as they started drafting their revolutionary manifesto as guerilla fighting (Gilkes).

Through an overwhelming public uprising and the a support from the military the Ethiopian Monarchy was broken and Emperor Haile Selasie, was overthrown in 1974. EPLF who has been fighting against the Emperial rule of Ethiopia since 1952 was stronger and had much more experience by 1974, which is the year TPLF and EPRP started their armed struggle. EPLF started supporting and training both Ethiopian rebels (EPRP and TPLF). TPLF objected to EPRP’s political ideologies and thus refused to allow EPRP to operate within Tigray Region, a move that aggravated and created friction between TPLF and EPLF (because EPLF’s aim was focused mainly on over throwing the Derg; therefore EPLF wanted TPLF and EPRP to work in usison to overthrow the Derg. During this time ELF, EPLF’s competing rebels were operating inside both Tigray Region and Eritrea to carry attacks against the Derg. TPLF sought to work with ELF, perceiving it to be a win-win situation until they faced border conflict in Badme in 1976. In addition, ELF’s continued to support TPLF’s competing armed group, Tigray Liberation Front (TLF) in the same Tigray Region. ELF and EPRP (TPLF’s other foe) managed to come to good terms and form alliances. Then TPLF drove EPRP out of Tigray and evicted ELF with the help of EPLF (Negash, p. 12-16).

PLF objected to TPLF’s 1976 manifesto that focused on liberation of Ethiopian nationalities and creating an ethnic federation. EPLF found it to be an unsustainable strategy, fearing that those nationalities would give greater focus to national identity and make it difficult establish a peaceful, homogenous national identity. Eritrea’s fear was that ethnic identity would rise in Ethiopia and future conflict amongst those ethnic groups within Ethiopia would cross the border to Eritrea; due to the overlap of ethnic groups divided only by a vague border (Negash, p. 15-16).

EPLF and TPLF’s other major ideological difference was that both rebels’ viewed the Soviet Union as the main arms provider to the Derg. Russia was viewed by TPLF as a revisionist party and they believed the system was “social-imperialist,” and therefore TPLF sought support in the Albanian model of communism. EPLF on the other hand believed the Soviet Union was a socialist system with a Leninist-style. Concomitantly, the communist party argued Russia’s support to the Derg military junta was a misunderstanding based on the political context present in the horn of Africa (Negash, p. 16-17).

 Ethiopia and Eritrea faced great conflict while determining the boundaries of their 620 mile, shared border. It is important to note that this discrepancy encompasses problems related to geographic location, historical relationship, colonial legacy, tangible and intangible values, states with multiple nations, nations with multiple states and rivalry. When Eritrea gained its independence, Ethiopia was left landlocked, which was an extensive hindrance to its economic development. The ports on the Red Sea costal line had always been important to the Ethiopian economy. Even when Eritrea was under the Italian colony, at least 25% of Ethiopia’s import and export goods were carried out through the Massawa port. It was one of the three most important reasons Italy sought to colonize Eritrea in the first place. Another important characteristic of Eritrea came from being a source of soldiers for Italy’s adventure else where in Africa, along with the strategic importance of the Red Sea region (Negash, P. 7-8).

Consequence

The war was highly consequential and costly to both countries, from its monetary expensive to its disruption of the citizen’s daily lives. It is believed that both countries spent several million dollars on military arms at a time when they can’t afford to feed their citizens. As noted, the 620 mile long border is inhabited by at least 5 different ethnic groups where thousands of Eritreans and Ethiopians live on opposing sides of the border. Due to this arrangement, after the war broke out 350,000 Ethiopians and 250,000 Eritreans were displaced.

During the few months of de facto cease fire, the Eritreans dug trenches and propagated it by saying Eritrea would never leave Badme. The Ethiopians coined the military engagement in Badme as “Operation Sunset”, and they fought their way to reclaim Badme, but it was achieved with heavy casualty from each side. Both countries estimated to have lost some 70,000-120,000 soldiers in the two-year war (Negash & Tronvoll 2).

Both governments have been trying to undermine each other’s securities by supporting and harboring rebel groups ever since the war. The refugee has also increased people fleeing both countries. In the Agence France-Presse report as recent as April 15, 2010, Ethiopia was opening a 4^th refugee camp in Tigray Region to accommodate for the ever-increasing Eritrean refugees. The Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs states that about 2,000 young Eritreans flee the country to “…avoid excessive repression, gross human rights violations and forced conscription into the army." Many human rights groups claim that Eritrea has turned into a "giant prison" (Agence).

From an economic perspective, both countries lose an immeasurable amount of potential foreign investment achieved by fostering cooperative cross border trade. Ethiopia now loses millions of dollars for port fees, while Eritrea’s ports are not being used. Eritrea on the other side loses its main trading partner prior to the war (Last). Large amounts of arable farm land is now unusable due to more than 400,000 landmines laid in those bordering territories. In addition, both sides have bombed major towns, thereby destroying important infrastructure (Reuters).

Eritrea-Ethiopia historical relationships

Two competing ethnic groups the Amharas and Tigrayan ruled the Ethiopia-Eritrean highlands during Ethiopian history since the early years of 14^th century. The Amhara and the Tigrayans are essentially cousins, and share the same race, religion, culture and language with some variation. Occupying the then southern parts of Ethiopia, the Amaharas, were more populated and the region was more arable and resourceful than the land of their Tigrayan cousins. The Tigrayans consequently, occupied the Northern part of the Ethiopian-Eritrean highlands. Besides the Tigrayans who live on both sides of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border along with other ethnic groups such as; the Afar, Saho, Kunama and Erob which creates a conflict between both states. (Negash, p. 5-9).

Geographer Ciampi noted that the Eritrea-Ethiopia border was negotiated and delimited in 1900, 1902 and 1908 but it was not properly demarcated. Italy deliberately refused the demarcation of the border in order to push its control and expand its umpire to the horn of Africa. In violation of the 1900 border treaty; it unilaterally interpreted the border to be under its Eritrean controlled territory, known as the Badme village. In 1916 Ethiopia tried to protest against the Italian presence in the areas inside the delimited treaty, but Ethiopia was not in a position to stand strong against the Italian power. This unilaterally drawn map is what the Eritrean government believes to be the product of the treaty of July 10, 1900 and holds it as the Uti Possidetis. Around 1930 Italy established some control in the Badme area and pushed its way to colonize Ethiopia, but Ethiopia resisted and the allied powers won the war and the control was then transferred to the British (Negash, p. 23-24).

In conclusion, Daniela Kroslak, deputy director of the Africa Program at the International Crisis Group, summarizes the issue best, as she noted, the virtual demarcation of the border did not solve the problem and the Eritrean government became frustrated with the UN for not pressuring Ethiopia to obey by independent decision, demanded that the peacekeepers leave the 15 mile buffer zone within its territory.  Although, when Eritrean expelled UN Peacekeepers and put restrictions on supplies, it managed to aggravate many countries that turned the international attention away from insisting on Ethiopia's compliance to deal with Eritrea's bad behavior. As Kroslak states, “The lingering, slow-simmering conflict on the border is unsustainable. Not only does it risk war, but it is used by both countries' governments to justify political repression. With an enemy always threatening and a war ever near, both regimes have clamped down on their societies, impeding all hope of democracy and economic growth” (Kroslak).

A lasting peace needs to address deep-rooted issues, such as growing authoritarianism and regional rivalry and of course physical demarcation keeping the interests of the local residents close. Clear, border boundaries and a better relationship with the west are two priority interests for Eritrea; while Ethiopian seeks to obtain access to Eritrean ports and ultimately stop the support of Ethiopia’s internal armed insurgencies (Kroslak).

Map of the disputed territorial claim

Works Cited

Agence France-Presse (15 Apr. 2010). Ethiopia opens new camp for Eritrean refugees. [online] Available: http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20100415/wl_africa_afp/eritreaethiopiarefugeesrights_20100415174022 (22 Apr. 2010).

BBC News (22 April, 2002). Badme: Village in no man's land. [online] Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1943527.stm (23 Apr. 2010).

BBC News. (24 Dec. 2009). Timeline: Eritrea. [online] Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1070861.stm (20 Apr. 2010).

Gilkes, P. (11 Oct. 2005). Foreign Policy In Focus. The War Between Ethiopia and Eritrea. [online] Available: http://www.fpif.org/reports/the_war_between_ethiopia_and_eritrea (15 Apr. 2010).

Habteselassie, K., and Dina, M. (1972). Ethiopia: A Short Illustrated History. Addis Abeba: Ministry of Education and Fine Arts.

Kroslak, D. (8 Aug. 2008). Unfinished Peace in the Horn of Africa. [online] Available: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/ethiopia-eritrea/kroslak-unfinished-peace-in-the-horn-of-africa.aspx (21 Apr. 2010).

Last, A. (13 Apr. 2000). War blocks Ethiopia's lifeline. [online] Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/712032.stm (23 Apr. 2010).

Negash, T., and Tronvoll, K. (2000). Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War. Athens: Ohio University Press.

Permanent Court of Arbitration (17 Aug. 2009). Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission. [online] Available: http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1151 (20 Mar. 2010).

Reuters (03 June 2008). Eritrea-Ethiopia border. [online] Available: http://www.alertnet.org/db/crisisprofiles/EE_BOR.htm?v=in_detail (23 Ar. 2010).